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PREFACE: FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY VOLUME
Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.*
I note with considerable satisfaction both the fiftieth anniversary of the
Notre Dame Lawyer and the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
momentous decision in Brown u. Board of Education.' Anniversaries are signif-
icant events because they afford us an opportunity to reflect upon the past and
chart our course for the future. During the half-century the Lawyer has been in
existence, one of the dominant themes of our time has been the growing realiza-
tion of the importance of civil and human rights.
I commend the Lawyer for its dedication to legal scholarship and, more
appropriately for this issue, for its contribution as a forum for civil rights. Fifteen
years ago, in a preface to a symposium on desegregation published by the Lawyer,
I wrote:
I personally do not know of any problem of our time that is more compli-
cated, more involved, more emotional, and perhaps more unsolved than the
problem of civil rights in our society.
2
Other civil rights symposiums include violence in the streets' and the recent
annual civil and human rights issue each October.4 The Lawyer has also pub-
lished the proceedings of the 1959 Notre Dame Conference on Civil Rights, one
of a series of conferences on public law subjects sponsored by the Notre Dame
Law School.' In these and in other articles, the Lawyer has explored and probed,
in a critical fashion, the crucial issues of civil rights in our society in a continuing
effort to make the law a more effective instrument of social justice.
The Lawyer has not only made a general commitment to civil and human
rights but also attempted to expand the discussion of civil and human rights
beyond the more familiar categories, such as school desegregation and job dis-
crimination. While these problems remain before us the Lawyer has pushed its
investigation further and has examined, for example, the civil rights of the
mentally retarded and, in this issue, criminal defense systems for the poor. The
Lawyer has admirably begun this task and I am confident that the Lawyer will
sustain its excellence in the field of civil rights.
One aspect of the Brown decision most relevant to law reviews is that deci-
sion's appreciation of the increasingly important relationship between law and
the social sciences. This relationship has important implications for any law
President, University of Notre Dame.
The author would like to acknowledge the generous scholarly assistance of Howard A.
Glickstein and John T. Bannon of the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights in the preparation
of this article.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Hesburgh, Foreword to the Symposium on the Problems and Responsibilities of Deseg-
regation, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER, preliminary page (1959).
3 Violence in the Streets, 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 497 (1965).
4 Civil and Human Rights-Reflections in 1972, 48 NoTR DAME LAWYER 5 (1972);
Civil and Human Rights-Reflections in 1973, 49 NOTRE DAME- LAWYER 5 (1973).
5 Wofford, Notre Dame Conference on Civil Rights: A Contribution to the Development
of Public Law, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 328 (1960).
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review interested in contributing to public policy in the field of civil rights. A
footnote' in Brown referred to studies made by sociologists and psychologists
who had studied the detrimental effects of racism and segregation on black
children. That footnote represents, in one sense, a culmination of the collective
hopes and efforts of a distinguished group of progressive jurists. Men like Roscoe
Pound and Louis D. Brandeis, who were closely associated with the development
of the sociological school of jurisprudence, saw the importance of the relation-
ship between law and social science in a rapidly changing democratic society.
The early work of these men, and others like them, prepared the way for the
Court's use of social science in Brown.
While that footnote was in one sense a culmination, it was in another sense
a beginning. The Brown decision was one of the most important decisions
handed down by the Court in this century and its reference to social science
studies paved the way for a further extension of the possibilities inherent in the
relationship between civil rights and the social sciences. It is safe to assume
that social science data will continue to be accepted and utilized by the courts.
If law reviews are to respond to the civil rights challenge, they must become
more innovative than they have been in the past.
Brown forged a marriage between the social sciences and the law. The
evolution from the few brief references to social science studies in Brown to a
massive social study like the Coleman Report' indicates how far this relationship
has come. Whether we like it or not, and I suspect there are many who do not,
social science knowledge will be utilized increasingly in the legislative formulation
of social policy. The law must go to social science as it becomes more and more
involved in the complex issues facing American society. An understanding of
the intricate relationship among law, social science, and public policy is ab-
solutely essential if we are to pursue both justice and effective policy in the field
of civil rights.
The implementation of the Brown decision is itself an interesting example
of the interaction between law, social science and public policy. Many conflicts
have developed in the years since Brown, and the promise implicit in that de-
cision has not yet been fulfilled. To be sure, there has been some progress and
some success, but there has not been enough. In light of the time, energy and
resources invested, progress in school desegregation has been dishearteningly
slow. After twenty years of litigation, congressional enactments, and administra-
tive guidelines, Department of Health, Education and Welfare statistics indicate
more progress in school desegregation being made in the South than in the North
and West.8 Even in some of those school systems that have been desegregated,
invidious and blatant racial discrimination persists. How is this possible twenty
years after Brown?
6 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
7 J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). The origins of
this report, popularly known as the Coleman Report, are to be found in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which provided that a survey be conducted and a report made concerning the lack
of availability of educational opportunities in public schools because of race, color, religion,
or national origin. The Report was the second largest social science research project in history
and it documented the lack of equal educational opportunity in American society.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, DIRECTORY OF PUBLIC ELF,
MENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SELECTED DISTRICTS, Table III (1972).
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Until 1954, seventeen states and the District of Columbia mandated racial
segregation in the public schools. In the twenty years prior to 1954, the Supreme
Court rendered decisions which chipped away at the doctrine of "separate but
equal."9 The end of the "separate but equal" doctrine came in 1954 when the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educatiore'° ruled that racial segregation
in the nation's public schools was unconstitutional because separate facilities
were inherently unequal. The Court put it this way:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal. Therefore we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
11
The Court did not determine how the states were to dismantle their dual
school systems or what deadlines would be imposed. Instead the Court invited
the interested parties to prepare briefs on how its decision should be implemented.
Southern state officials argued against specific instructions or set guidelines
by the Court. Instead, they recommended that the United States district courts
make the determination of whether or not school districts complied with Brown.
Thurgood Marshall, chief legal spokesman for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, asked the Court to set September of 1956 as
the deadline for ending segregation in the public schools; he also asked the Court
to issue firm and explicit instructions to the district court judges. Marshall
argued that the Supreme Court had to arm the district judges with authority to
carry out its decision, otherwise there would be untold delay. 2 Unfortunately,
the Court rejected Marshall's advice. Southern state officials obtained most of
what they wanted. They did so because the guidelines handed down by the
Court were too flexible, giving district court judges virtually unlimited discre-
tion in dealing with desegregation. The Court said:
The judgments below.., are reversed and the cases are remanded to the
district courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees
consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties
to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with
all deliberate speed.'"
With very few exceptions, the South initially made no voluntary effort to
comply with Brown. In the District of Columbia and in the border states of
Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma, how-
ever, immediate progress was made. Despite many difficult problems that had
9 See, e.g., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 681 (1948) ; I Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 495.
12 J. PELTASON, FIFTY--IGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGEs AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 15 (1961).
13 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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to be overcome, school districts in the Border States moved steadily toward
desegregation. Southern States not only failed to make school desegregation
progress but made every effort to fight and blatantly defy the Supreme Court's
decision.
In the Deep South the chosen path was one of massive resistance-a policy
implemented by enacting law after law deliberately designed to "legalize" the
circumvention of Brown. This crude but effective strategy forced extended liti-
gation of each of the questionable statutes. In resisting the Brown decision,
Southern lawmakers displayed far more ingenuity, energy and boldness than
they ever expended in attempting to solve the problems of poverty and illiteracy
which have plagued the region for generations. A plethora of laws encompassing
everything from Calhoun's thoroughly discredited doctrine of nullification to the
self-destructive proposal that the public schools be permanently dosed were
quickly enacted by Southern state legislatures. States offered tuition grants to
parents of white children who wished to send their children to private schools to
avoid desegregation. In some instances, where desegregation had been ordered
by the courts, the public schools were closed and children of both races were
denied an education. These laws were passed with full knowledge that they
contravened federal law and were therefore unconstitutional.
Defiance achieved new levels of respectability in 1956 when 101 members
of the United States Congress, 19 Senators and 82 House members, signed the
Southern Manifesto. This document condemned the Brown decision; it com-
mended those Southern States that had announced a policy of total resistance
to desegregation. In addition, the Manifesto declared an intention to use "all
lawful means" to bring about a reversal of the Court's decision.14 That so many
members of the Congress signed such a document was nothing less than a na-
tional disgrace. Quasi-official acts such as these gave the trappings of legitimacy
to this massive resistance movement; by placing ends above means, Southern
officials encouraged the worst elements in Southern society to take any steps.
perceived necessary, including violence, to stop desegregation.
The Supreme Court began to show increasing impatience with the lack
of progress in school desegregation. In 1964, in the case involving the Prince
Edward County, Virginia, school system, 5 the Court warned that desegregation
had proceeded with entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed. "The
time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that phrase can no longer
justify denying... to school children their constitutional rights ...... 16 In this
case the Court held that the dosing of the public schools in Prince Edward
County, while other schools remained open in the state, denied black students
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The
Court also struck down various state statutes giving tuition grants and other
tax breaks to parents who sent their children to private segregated schools to
avoid attending public desegregated ones.
The Supreme Court's failure to formulate specific standards to guide en-
14 J. FRANKLIN & I. STARR, eds., THE NEoo IN TWENTIETH-CENTURy AMERIcA 284
(1967).
15 Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
16 Id. at 234.
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forcement of its decisions was an understandable but serious error. The South
was quick to realize that it had won a substantial victory when the Court failed
to establish specific guidelines with precise standards for desegregating the public
schools. Problems of implementation were compounded by charging the United
States district courts with the task of applying and enforcing the decision. The
courts were poorly suited to make and enforce unpopular policy decisions. Many
of the district court judges shared the biases of the region they served and many
times those biases were reflected in their decisions.1 7 It is likely that clear guide-
lines and directives from the Supreme Court would have resulted in more rapid
and uniform enforcement by the district courts. In a lapse of political and
administrative judgment, however, the Supreme Court passed the pressure on to
the district courts who either were not able or were not willing to handle it.
Those spirited district judges who did attempt to enforce Brown were sub-
jected to extreme pressures. In many cases, threats of physical violence and
social ostracism were the rewards received for efforts to enforce the law. Little
support came from the Eisenhower Administration. President Eisenhower neither
provided moral leadership nor used his powers as Chief Executive to enforce
the Brown decision. By refusing to express public support for Brown, the Eisen-
hower Administration fueled the hopes of segregationists. It was only after
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus used the National Guard to block black stu-
dents sent by court order to a previously all-white high school that President
Eisenhower finally acted by sending federal troops to Little Rock.
In 1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Congress became mean-
ingfully involved in the school desegregation struggle. For the first ten years
after Brown, the federal judiciary had assumed virtually total responsibility for
effectuating school desegregation. Unfortunately, the success achieved by the
judiciary was extremely limited.
In retrospect, it was unfortunate that the first branch of the national gov-
ernment to recognize the right of black Americans to equal educational oppor-
tunities had to be the Supreme Court. For several reasons, the Supreme Court
was a less desirable vehicle for this new policy than either the legislative or
executive branches of government. First, while the Brown decision represented
a significant shift in public policy and while it may be obvious to academicians
that policy-making is one of the Court's primary functions, it is not so obvious
to the general public. The public tends to perceive the Court's function as one
of simply interpreting the law. In interpreting the law, however, the Court
almost always has considerable latitude in making decisions. There are few
laws so specific that a judge has no discretion in deciding a new problem sub-
sumed under a particular law. The public becomes aware of the Court's policy-
making role in landmark cases like Brown; in cases like this, many citizens
question the Court's authority to make such a significant policy change. The
traditional theory of representative government is that important policy decisions
should be made by the more representative branches of government. When
doubt exists as to the Court's right to make a significant policy decision, problems
of legitimacy arise which may eventually diminish compliance with the decision.
17 J. PELTASON, supra note 12, at 20.
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This is precisely what happened in the Brown case. A considerable segment of
the population of the South was led to believe that the Court went beyond its
authority; they therefore felt justified in refusing to obey the decision. Congress
would have been a more effective policy-maker simply because there would have
been less doubt about the legitimacy of the decision. 8
Congress also would have been a more appropriate agent of social change
since it can better formulate uniform standards for all school districts and use
its financial resources to supervise and regulate individual school boards. Courts
are not readily suited to initiating and enforcing new and controversial policies.
But because of congressional and executive inaction, the Supreme Court took
the initiative and forged a new, courageous and just social policy.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare was charged with the responsibility of enforcing Title
VI of that Act. Title VI provided that recipients of federal financial assistance
who practiced racial discrimination could have those funds cut off. The threat
of a fund cutoff was strengthened by the passage of the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act of 1965, which infused large new sums of federal money into
education. HEW formulated guidelines which were to be followed in enforcing
Title VI. The guidelines set 1967 as the target date for complete desegregation
of the public school systems. School districts were required to make a substantial
start toward desegregation by September 1965. At first, progress was painfully
slow; but despite cautious use of the Title VI enforcement mechanism, HEW
secured substantial school desegregation within five years after passage of the
Civil Rights Act.'9
With the change in administrations in 1969, the emphasis in government
enforcement of school desegregation shifted."9 In his 1968 campaign for the
presidency, Richard Nixon made it clear that he opposed busing and that he
favored preservation of the neighborhood school. Strom Thurmond, United
States Senator from South Carolina, stumped the South spreading the word
that Nixon would soften HEW guidelines if Nixon were elected to the presi-
dency. Nixon was elected and the Nixon touch on school desegregation was felt
in July 1969 when the administration announced new procedures for the federal
effort to desegregate public schools. Equivocation and backsliding constituted
the core of the new administration's approach. Fifteen years after the Brown
decision, the Nixon administration announced that it would allow school dis-
tricts to get "limited delays" in implementing desegregation plans. The admin-
istration's new approach also deemphasized fund cutoffs as a means of gaining
compliance with the law.
In the summer of 1969, HEW and the Justice Department went into court
on behalf of a number of Mississippi school districts, already under court orders
to desegregate that September, asking that these school districts be allowed an-
18 For an interesting application uf this argument see P. KUR.AND, POLITICS, THE 'CON-
sTrruTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 158 (1970).
19 Edelman, Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973: A Judicial-Political Overview,
407 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 32, 39 (1973).
20 Mitchell, Moods and Changes: The Civil Rights Record of the Nixon Administration,
49 NoTa DAwM LAwyER 63, 64 (1973).
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other year before they implemented their desegregation plans. The administra-
tion argued that immediate implementation of the desegregation plans would
produce educational chaos and confusion. These delaying tactics were severely
criticized by many of the attorneys in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department and a number of resignations followed.21 Clearly the administration
was subordinating well-defined legal mandates to narrow partisan considerations.
One perceptive observer has written:
The goal was to undermine the effective administrative fund cutoff require-
ments and return the burden, politically as well as actually, to the courts
for effective compliance--a slower and less effective method . 2
The administration's proposed delays for the Mississippi school districts
were challenged in court by black plaintiffs. In Alexander v. Holmes County
Board of Education," the Supreme Court refused to permit any further delays
and ordered immediate desegregation. The Court said:
[Tihe Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for additional time
because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of
allowing "all deliberate speed" for desegregation is no longer constitutionally
permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court, the obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate
now and hereafter only unitary schools.
24
Even after Alexander, however, HEW continued to emphasize bargaining
with school districts to secure voluntary compliance. Very few enforcement
proceedings were begun and those that were under way did not result in fund
cutoffs after determinations of noncompliance. After 1969, very few school
districts had their funds terminated.25
By January 1970, the busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial balance
had become a subject of heated controversy. For the Nixon Administration,
the busing issue became a convenient smoke screen to hide its enforcement
failures and create a political basis for inaction. Unfortunately, the politicizing
of the busing issue diverted attention from the urgent need to eradicate the
nation's segregated school systems; the administration succeeded in making bus-
ing an emotionally charged issue.
Although the percentage of pupils transported to school nationally in-
creased steadily from 1920 to 1970, less than three percent of all pupils bused
were bused for purposes of desegregation. Former Secretary of Transportation
John Volpe has stated that less than one percent of the increase in busing in
1972 was attributable to desegregation.2" Nor was the busing of schoolchildren
21 H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their
Consequences 90 (1972). The administration also was criticized by the Commission on Civil
Rights. See U.S. 'COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION (1969).
22 Edelman, supra note 19, at 40.
23 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
24 Id. at 20.
25 When the Johnson Administration left office in January 1969, more than two hundred
Title VI fund terminations had occurred. Edelman at 39.
26 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, YOUR CHILD AND BUSING 7 (1972).
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to achieve school desegregation as expensive as some critics suggested, since
the latest national figures available showed that less than four percent of all
educational expenditures in the United States was spent on pupil transportation
of all kinds." The public has generally been unaware of facts like these and the
busing debate has been carried on in an emotionally charged atmosphere. In
1973, a national survey revealed not only vast misinformation about busing but
also a close relationship between erroneous beliefs about busing and opposition
to it.
28
In March 1970, the President issued a statement on elementary and second-
ary school desegregation in which the question of busing was again raised. The
President sought to convince his critics that he supported school desegregation
and that his Administration had every intention of enforcing the law. The
President's position was that the Court in Alexander had left a number of ques-
tions unanswered and in these areas he was free to determine policy. He inter-
preted the Court as saying that de jure segregation was illegal and had to be
eradicated, but that de facto segregation was not illegal. This simplistic dichot-
omy29 allowed the administration to preserve the status quo in much of the
country by moving against official segregation on the one hand, while preserving
neighborhood schools and avoiding busing on the other.
Following the President's March 1970 statement, a get-tough policy against
de jure segregation was pursued. During the summer of 1970, officials from
HEW and the Justice Department met with school officials from recalcitrant
school districts; the school districts were ordered to desegregate or be taken to
court. By the end of August the administration had filed suits against a number
of these school districts. A month later, the administration was claiming success
in school desegregation because of the high percentage of Southern school districts
operating under voluntary or court-ordered desegregation plans. While con-
siderable progress toward school desegregation had been made in the South, it
was not as spectacular as the administration claimed. A more accurate indicator
of the amount of progress made in school desegregation was the number of
students attending desegregated schools. In 1964, approximately one percent
of the black schoolchildren in the eleven states of the old Confederacy were in
schools with whites. As of 1972, the latest year for which comprehensive figures
are available from HEW, 46 percent of the black schoolchildren were in schools
which were predominantly white. Paradoxically, the gains being made in the
South were being offset by the growing de facto segregation in the North. The
1972 HEW figures show only twenty-eight percent of the black schoolchildren
in the North and West attending predominantly white schools." It is in these
27 Id. at 15.
28 Wall, What the Public Doesn't Know Hurts, Civil Rights Digest 27 (Summer 1973).
29 The validity of the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation has been
challenged. See Statement of the United States Commission on Civil Rights concerning the
"Statement by the President on Elementary and Secondary School Desegregation" 6-9 (1970);
see also the concurring opinion by Justice Powell in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 217 (1973).
30 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, DMECTORY OF PUBLIC ELEMEN-
TAlY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SELECTED DISTRICTS, Table III (1972).
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rather startling figures that the challenge to the fulfillment of Brown lies. It is
in the North and West that the struggle for desegregation of the public schools
will be won or lost.
Two major political and legal roadblocks stand in the way of school deseg-
regation in the North and West. The first is the de jure-de facta distinction;
the second is the unnecessary and unrealistic emphasis placed on the boundary
between city and suburb. There is little substance to the whole concept of
de facto segregation. In many cases, school segregation that seemed to result
from accidental housing patterns turned out, after close examination, to have
resulted from decisions made by public officials. Government at the local, state,
and federal levels has been implicated. In many communities, for example,
racial zoning ordinances were an important factor in creating and maintaining
racially exclusive neighborhoods. This obviously is not de facto segregation; it
is de jure segregation pure and simple. Despite the questionable validity of the
distinction, the Supreme Court utilized it in the first Northern school desegre-
gation case it decided.
In Keyes v. School District No. I, the outcome was largely determined by
the marshalling of carefully detailed proof of the Denver School Board's actions
which resulted in segregation. In Keyes, the Court held that even though the
state of Colorado never had a school segregation law, the action of the Denver
School Board was enough to constitute de jure segregation. The Denver School
Board, by manipulating student attendance zones and school site selections and
by following a neighborhood school policy, created and maintained racially
segregated schools throughout the district.32 The Keyes case tells us that even
though the de jure-de facto distinction is a questionable one, it can be success-
fully utilized to desegregate Northern public school systems.
The second and more formidable roadblock to school desegregation is the
increasing division of our metropolitan areas into predominantly black central
cities and almost all-white suburban communities. This trend has presented
extreme difficulties to the meaningful desegregation of the public schools in
many cities. To meet this problem, law suits have been brought in a number of
cities to achieve the consolidation of the central city schools with the surrounding
suburban communities." These suits have proceeded on the theory that the
31 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
32 Id. at 192.
33 Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972),
rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). (The District Court ordered
the merger of the Richmond City school system, 73 percent black, with two surrounding
county systems, both more than 90 percent white, to desegregate the Richmond schools. The
Court of Appeals reversed the order.); United States v. Board of School Commissioners of
the City of Indianapolis, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1406 (7th
Cir. 1973). (The District Court found that the Indianapolis school board had a deliberate
policy of segregating minority students from majority students in its schools. This de jure
segregation was imputed to the state of Indiana. The District Court held that effective deseg-
regation of the Indianapolis public schools could not be achieved within the geographical
bounds of the city and that busing from the city to the suburbs would be appropriate. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.); Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich.
1972) aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973). (The District
Court found substantial evidence that the segregation in the Detroit public schools was aided
by the Detroit Board of Education and the Michigan Board of Education. Both of these
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state has the ultimate responsibility to assure equal educational opportunity to
every child within its borders, that equal educational opportunity was not
attainable in a segregated environment, that the boundary lines between munic-
ipalities were artificial divisions that could be altered under appropriate circum-
stances, and that the consolidation of school districts to achieve school desegre-
gation presented such circumstances. Unfortunately, this approach to school
segregation in metropolitan areas received a severe setback on July 25, 1974,
when the Supreme Court decided Bradley v. Milliken, the case involving the
Detroit public school system and surrounding suburban public school systems.
While not completely ruling out the crossing of city boundaries to, achieve
school desegregation, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected a metropolitan busing
plan that would have substantially reduced public school segregation in the
Detroit area. I agree with Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion that this decision
represents a giant step backward in the twenty-year struggle to achieve school
desegregation. In essence the Court has said that remedies for metropolitan
segregation are limited by existing political boundaries. Along with Justice
Marshall I feel that "[O]ur nation... will be ill-served by the Court's refusal
to remedy separate and unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn
together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together."
Fortunately, however, the Court's decision does not foreclose all possibilities of
metropolitan school desegregation.
The Court itself left open the possibility of cross-district school desegre-
gation where it could be shown that the district boundaries were somehow
devised to maintain segregated communities. In his majority opinion, Chief
Justice Burger held that a desegregation plan involving more than one school
district could be justified only if discriminatory acts in one district produced
segregation in the other or only where district lines had been deliberately drawn
to separate black students from white. Admittedly, these conditions will be
difficult to meet in future city-suburban merger cases.
Another approach to metropolitan desegregation is through the voluntary
cooperation of neighboring school districts. One example of the approach is in
Monroe County, New York, which includes the city of Rochester. This city-
suburban transfer program is run by the Rochester, Brighton, Pittsford, Penfield,
West Irondequoit, Brockport, Wheatland-Chili and Webster school districts,
plus nine parochial schools. The program was initiated in 1964 with the dual
purpose of improving educational opportunities for minority students from the
inner city and ending the racial and cultural isolation of both white and black
students. Voluntary metropolitan area projects like the one in Rochester are also
in operation in Boston and Hartford. Efforts of this kind to solve the problem
of metropolitan school desegregation are encouraging and deserving of federal
support.
But perhaps the most effective way of assuring equal educational oppor-
Boards were instrumentalities of the state of Michigan. The District Court also found that
desegregation of the Detroit public schools could not be accomplished within the geographical




tunity for all of our children is for Congress to enact legislation providing for a
national policy on school desegregation. 4 Congressional action affords greater
promise for effective relief than any action by the courts. Courts must proceed on
a case-by-case basis while Congress can establish a uniform national standard.
Equally important is the fact that effective remedies may require expenditures of
substantial sums of money and only Congress can provide the needed relief. I
recognize the reluctance of Congress concerning the school desegregation process,
particularly as it involves student transportation. However, I hope that any
hostility will be overcome by an understanding that without metropolitan ap-
proaches to school desegregation, the promise of Brown will have little chance
of being fulfilled. Surely this would be an American tragedy.
34 In 1967, the United States Commission on Civil Rights recommended the passage of
federal legislation to provide uniform, national standards for the desegregation of our schools
and pointed to the need to develop metropolitan approaches. See U.S. COmMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Vol. I, 187-192, 209-212, 239-263
(1967).
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